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Replication initiatives in psychology continue to gather considerable attention from far outside the field, as well as
controversy from within. Some accomplishments of these initiatives are noted, but this article focuses on why they
do not provide a general solution for what ails psychology. There are inherent limitations to mass replications ever
being conducted in many areas of psychology, both in terms of their practicality and their prospects for improving
the science. Unnecessary compromises were built into the ground rules for design and publication of the Open
Science Collaboration: Psychology that undermine its effectiveness. Some ground rules could actually be flipped
into guidance for how not to conduct replications. Greater adherence to best publication practices, transparency
in the design and publishing of research, strengthening of independent post-publication peer review and firmer
enforcement of rules about data sharing and declarations of conflict of interest would make many replications
unnecessary. Yet, it has been difficult to move beyond simple endorsement of these measures to consistent
implementation. Given the strong institutional support for questionable publication practices, progress will
depend on effective individual and collective use of social media to expose lapses and demand reform. Some
recent incidents highlight the necessity of this.
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Bad publication practices keep good scientists
unnecessarily busy, as in replicability projects.- Björn
Brembs [1]
In revising this paper, I strengthened its focus on
explaining why we cannot look to replication initiatives
as the primary means of salvaging the trustworthiness of
psychology. I benefited from two excellent reviews that
encouraged me to pursue this theme. I interpreted the
reviewers’ comments as a prompt to specify the vantage
point from which I view replication initiatives: that of a
stakeholder in improving the trustworthiness of the
psychological literature who is outside of personality and
social psychology, the areas of psychology to which
replication initiatives are most relevant. I also had the
benefit of an unfolding controversy generated by a crit-
ical commentary [2] and a response [3] from some of
the authors of the Open Science Collaboration’s (OSC)
Replication Project: Psychology article in Science [4] and,
in particular, the debate that this exchange prompted in
social media.
Point of view
I am a clinical health psychologist and mental health
researcher. While I continue to publish peer-reviewed
articles, I have increasingly turned my attention to (1)
blogging and activism to improve the trustworthiness of
biomedicine and science, particularly psychology; (2)
generating an appropriate skepticism about the literature
and its portrayal in the media; and (3) fostering a
citizen-scientist orientation in consumers, arming them
with the tools to decide for themselves the credibility of
the advice being offered to them, and further tools to
access and evaluate information that is beyond their
expertise, but nonetheless required for their personal
decision-making.
In my early career as a faculty member at University
of California, Berkeley, my colleagues in personality and
social psychology tried to persuade me that they were
the real scientists of the field. Even if I was a clinical
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research psychologist, they argued, I was too concerned
with practical issues, whereas they were concerned with
the theory and methodology on which I would depend.
They actually convinced me that the relatively smaller
grants that they were receiving were more significant
than the usually larger National Institute of Health
grants, because their grants came from the more presti-
gious National Science Foundation.
As an outside stakeholder, I now view personality and
social psychology as a source of frustration. Andrew
Gelman [5] captures one half of my annoyance:
“All sorts of ridiculous studies on topics such as
political moderation and shades of gray, or power
pose, or fat arms and political attitudes, or ovulation
and vote preference, or ovulation and clothing, or
beauty and sex ratios, or elderly-related words and
walking speed, or subliminal smiley faces and attitudes
toward immigration, or ESP in college students, or
baseball players with K in their names being more
likely to strike out, or brain scans and political
orientation, or the Bible Code, are getting published
in top journals and getting lots of publicity. Indeed,
respected organizations such as the Association for
Psychological Science and the British Psychological
Society have promoted what I (and many others)
would consider junk science.”
I would go further. Articles consist of small groupings
of small studies assembled by an unknown sampling of
the studies run in a lab. Dependent measures are typic-
ally of unestablished internal or external validity, other
than they have been previously used. Most measures are
obtained by self-report, making the data vulnerable to
demand characteristics and extraneous influences. The
experimental manipulations are of untested external val-
idity, but the widest generalizability is claimed. There’s
an overrepresentation of results just barely achieving
statistical significance, which is of dubious importance
anyway, except for satisfying the confirmation bias re-
quired for publication [6]. From my vantage point, these
problems are compounded by the publicity machines of
professional organizations and journals screaming “Listen
up consumers, here are scientific results that you must ac-
commodate in your life.” The press releases are meant to
be digested in the moment and forgotten. But checking
claims made a few years ago destroys any credibility that
might be accorded to current claims. For instance, consider
a 2011 press release from the Association for Psychological
Science [6], “Life is one big priming experiment”:
“Scientists have shown again and again that they can
very subtly cue people’s unconscious minds to think
and act certain ways. These cues might be
concepts—like cold or fast or elderly—or they might
be goals like professional success; either way, these
signals shape our behavior, often without any
awareness that we are being manipulated.
This is humbling, especially when you think about
what it means for our everyday beliefs and actions.
The priming experiments take place in laboratories,
using deliberately contrived signals, but in fact our
world is full of cues that act on our minds all the
time, for better or for worse. Indeed, many of our
actions are reactions to random stimuli outside our
consciousness, meaning that the lives we lead are
much more automated than we like to acknowledge.”
Many of us familiar with such priming research would
attach little weight to whether findings of such studies
can be directly replicated, although it would be not be
surprising if they were not. Indeed, one of the shortcom-
ings of the RP:P initiative is that it had no provision for
screening out candidates for replication for which a con-
sensus could be reached that the research hypotheses were
improbable and not warranting the effort and resources re-
quired for a replication to establish this. Inclusion of such
studies led to a waste of resources replicating bad research
and a challenge to the credibility of the generalizability of
claims based on what was replicated.
Personality and social psychologists have no monopoly
on questionable research practices, but the prevalence and
salience of such studies in the literature can be attributed
in part to institutional agenda and questionable publica-
tion practices, to which they passively and actively give
assent as authors, reviewers, and editors. Minimally, they
give far too much praise and are too silent at the wrong
times in the face of a recurring pattern.
The second half of my frustration is the rampant un-
declared conflict of interests when personality and social
psychologists are aided by professional organizations
and journals in making money and accruing other bene-
fits from publishing and promoting findings of question-
able quality and substantive significance. In the typical
case, a manuscript that is a dubious collection of flawed
and underpowered studies slips through peer review and
is published, with many of its initial flaws intact. Its early
release on the Internet is coordinated with press releases
from professional organizations, journals, and the au-
thors themselves and their press agents. Op ed pieces
and derivative articles in the media, particularly busi-
ness- and corporate -oriented media, echo and even
“churnal” the carefully crafted publicity. The pinnacle of
success for personality and social psychologists seems to
be a TED Talk, which provides credibility to claims even
exceeding publication in a peer-reviewed paper. The
timing of such talks often fuels suspicion that they too
are part of the larger publicity effort promoting not only
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career advancement, but financially rewarding products.
Soon after the publicizing of early release of articles
comes dependably the launch of commercial products
such as corporate speaking gigs, self-help books, and
workshops. In such cases, I don’t recall the original
peer-reviewed articles ever been accompanied by decla-
rations of conflicts of interest to alert readers to the
obvious possible risk of bias.
If this sounds like a jaded viewpoint, note that the
APS press release “Life is one big priming experiment”
had, embedded in it, a click link for purchasing a book
by the press release’s author. A more recent example is
the self-help book, Rethinking Positive Thinking [7], pro-
moted in a featured book signing at the APS annual con-
vention, as well as web links in an advertisement for the
British Psychological Society Division of Health Psychology
Annual Meeting. Googling the title will reveal a remark-
able network of coordinated publicity fitting the pattern
described above. The website dedicated to promoting the
book (http://www.woopmylife.org/) lists over a dozen arti-
cles in major media outlets, along with gushing endorse-
ments from other personality and social psychologists
who, if one Googles them, have their own self-help prod-
ucts to promote. Elsewhere [8] I have provided a critique
of the quality of the research that is cited in this book and
its relevance to self-improvement and health promotion.
As I cultivate skepticism in consumers and provide
them with tools to decide for themselves about the trust-
worthiness of what they read, I find that such coordi-
nated efforts seemingly marshaling the endorsements of
professional organizations in the name of science are
disempowering and disorienting. The initiatives are cal-
culated to shame consumers for not doing the best that
they could in terms of physical and mental health and
material well-being. The solution being offered is that
they buy the dubious products that are being offered
with the branding of being more sciencey than similar
goods, as evidenced by publications in peer reviewed
journals and being singled out for praise by scientific or-
ganizations and those same journals.
I regularly critique the studies associated with these
initiatives in my blog posts, usually having no problem
finding obvious scientific flaws and inevitable exagger-
ation. Too often, I cannot resist the quixotic urge to
challenge particularly outrageous claims. In doing so
in conventional channels, like letters to the editor and
occasional calls for retraction, I renew my awareness
of how resistant the personality and social psychology
literature is to post publication peer review and self-
correction. I return to that topic later.
Two cheers for replication initiatives
Doubts about the trustworthiness the psychological
literature cannot be euphemized away as only the
“false-positives-reduction side” of the “evidentiary value
movement” helping psychology converge on truth over
time [9] or outright dispensed with the denialism of
Gilbert et al.’s claims that “the reproducibility of psycho-
logical science is quite high.” [2]. On the other hand, the
RP:P authors’ response [3] to Gilbert et al.’s criticism is
hardly satisfying: “Using the Reproducibility Project:
Psychology data, both optimistic and pessimistic conclu-
sions about reproducibility are possible, and neither are
yet warranted.”
The RP:P article in Science [4] is nonetheless remark-
able for having selected 100 studies from three presti-
gious psychological journals and negotiated the original
authors’ involvement in an attempt to replicate a large
number of findings. Outside stakeholders will note the
narrow range of subfields of psychology providing the
studies and, of necessity, the narrow range of method-
ologies – survey, simple computer-administrative tasks,
and internet studies using college students or internet
samples. The simplistic literal interpretation is that most
reported findings in this sample proved exaggerated or
false, but we cannot know how widely to generalize or
the source or practical significance of this finding. Out-
side stakeholders should resist making any quantitative
generalization from the RP:P to the untrustworthiness of
the psychological literature in general. But on the face of
it, Gilbert’s [10] assertion that the results confirm “the
replication rate in psychology is quite high—indeed, it is
statistically indistinguishable from 100 %” seems exag-
gerated or outright false.
We need to appreciate some inherent limitations to
replication initiatives, including the poor prospects or
even desirability of extending them into all areas of
psychology. As seen in the studies sampled for the re-
cent RP:P initiative, without an extraordinary and un-
likely shifting of resources, replication efforts are mainly
feasible only in some areas of psychology and, in par-
ticular, readily administered surveys and laboratory
tasks. This serious restriction and outright bias in cover-
age encourages the unwarranted assumption that these
particular areas of psychology are distinctively prone to
untrustworthiness of findings.
We should not expect replication initiatives in
many areas of psychology
The lack of replication initiatives for most areas of
psychology is notable. It is not always for lack of ef-
forts to organize them, but because of the formidable
practical barriers that are encountered. Some repre-
sent problems in the appropriateness of replication
initiatives which recur across psychology outside the
narrow confines of the studies sampled by the RP:P
project, but some reflect the practical issues and most
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pressing problems in the untrustworthiness of findings in
particular areas.
Infant studies
Many developmental psychology and infant study labs
have struggled to accumulate their cohorts, facing the
formidable barrier of enticing parents to give consent for
their children’s participation and to return for repeated
assessments. Of necessity, many infant studies remain
inadequately powered, particularly those requiring deliv-
ery of complex manipulations to well defined samples. It
is difficult enough to recruit and retain subjects for fresh
new studies, where parent invitation and consent forms
can extol the studies’ likelihood of generating new know-
ledge with new promises of the application of findings. It
is even more of a challenge to justify studies to parents
that merely test the trustworthiness of past findings.
David Peterson [11] points out that babies are more
difficult to study than adults because they are more
likely to fall asleep, get distracted, or put investigators’
key stimuli in their mouths. As Michael Frank [12] has
aptly detailed, developmental psychology and infant
studies have all the challenges of producing trustworthy
findings of the rest of psychology and more:
“The average infancy study – including many I've
worked on myself – has the issues we've identified in
the rest of the psychology literature: low power, small
samples, and undisclosed analytic flexibility. Add to
this the fact that many infancy findings are never
replicated, and even those that are replicated may
show variable results across labs. All of these factors
lead to a situation where many of our empirical
findings are too weak to build theories on.
In addition, there is a second, more infancy-specific
problem that I am also worried about. Small decisions in
infancy research – anything from the lighting in the lab
to whether the research assistant has a beard – may po-
tentially affect data quality, because of the sensitivity of
infants to minor variations in the environment. In fact,
many researchers believe that there is huge intrinsic
variability between developmental labs, because of un-
avoidable differences in methods and populations (hid-
den moderators). These beliefs lead to the conclusion
that replication research is more difficult and less reli-
able with infants, but we don't have data that bear one
way or the other on this question.”
Discussions on developmental psychology listserv’s
and other fora have also raised questions about credit
and contribution toward the professional advancement
available to junior investigators participating in replica-
tion initiatives. These problems are shared with efforts
to mount large-scale replication initiatives in other areas
of psychology. The large numbers of authors and institu-
tions needing to be mobilized (the RP:P article had 270
authors) make it more difficult to isolate the distinctive
individual contributions needed to justify career ad-
vancement. Identifying individual contributions is always
a problem for multi-author projects, but it is particularly
so in research with populations requiring extensive re-
sources to accrue sufficient numbers of subjects for ad-
equately powered single studies. Not unreasonably,
hiring and promotion decisions depend on evidence that
junior faculty can independently choose research ques-
tions and methods, direct analyses, and interpret find-
ings that advance the field.
Clinical and health psychology interventions
The literature evaluating clinical and health psychology in-
terventions in randomized trials has long been dominated
by underpowered, low-quality studies with inadequate
control groups [13, 14]. For many such interventions,
there are insufficient trials to provide estimates of effect
size, after the exclusion of low powered, methodologically
poor studies [15, 16]. Moreover, the best predictor of the
outcome of a randomized trial remains investigator alle-
giance [17], which accounts for 69 % of the effect size of
psychotherapy outcome studies [18]. Randomized trials
conducted by investigators with investments in particular
treatments consistently obtain larger effect sizes, some-
times improbably large. As an example, consider the effect
size obtained by promoters of problem-solving therapy for
cancer patients [19]. The claimed effect size of 4.32, ten
times higher than other psychological interventions, had
to be excluded from meta-analyses as an extreme outlier
[20, 21]. Yet, for many clinical and health psychology
interventions, there are insufficient trials to provide esti-
mates of effect size, after the exclusion of both low
powered, methodologically poor studies and research
conducted by those with conflicts of interest [22].
Problems in clinical trials evaluating psychological
interventions were appreciated long before the develop-
ment of replication initiatives. But a broad, systematic
effort like the RP:P to replicate existing clinical trials of
psychological interventions is not feasible and has be-
come even less so in an era of shrinking resources for
research. Of course, we should seek independent replica-
tions of individual published randomized trials wherever
we can, as we always have. But that effort will be of ne-
cessity piecemeal. We need to consider the likelihood
that original studies are often underpowered, and so we
should discourage the common practice of relying on
what are essentially pilot studies for generating esti-
mated effect sizes, rather than simply demonstrating
feasibility or acceptability [23]. We need to turn off the
spigots, stop allowing small studies from entering effect
sizes into the literature and withhold judgments about
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efficacy until the availability of larger-scale, more meth-
odologically sophisticated studies. Any effort to simply
replicate a broad array of small studies on the same scale
is a distraction and even an exacerbation of the problem
of consistent failures to replicate initially large effect sizes
from small, methodologically poor studies conducted by
investigators advocating a particular treatment.
Observational epidemiologic studies
Large-scale observational, clinical epidemiologic studies
pose special issues, particularly when the results are sum-
moned in support of public health policies, as in attempts
to reduce the adverse health consequences of obesity [24].
There have been demonstrations that the results of such
observational studies can readily be manipulated to appear
to favor policies preferred by the individual investigator
and politicians [25]. Moreover, requirements of high im-
pact journals that such studies specify explicitly their rele-
vance to social and public health policies provide a strong
incentive to spin results, particularly with the tight compe-
tition for the scarce space being allocated to such studies
in these journals. When independent replications can be
conducted in new samples, we should by all means take
advantage of such opportunities. But organizing a new
prospective cohort study for the specific purpose of
examining a particular hypothesis with public health
implications is generally not feasible in terms of time
and resources.
Another example of a large and troubled area of cor-
relational observational studies are the thousands of
studies investigating depressive symptoms and other
highly correlated negative affect variables [26] as a cause
of death, dementia, coronary artery disease, cancer,
asthma, diabetes, Parkinson’s disease, COPD, headaches,
insomnia, acne, health problems after pregnancy, lower
back pain, anorgasmia, premature ejaculation, impo-
tence, hypertension, HIV viral load, poor glycemic con-
trol, constipation, diarrhea, nausea, chronic pelvic pain,
incontinence, …and flatulence. Literatures are developed
around specific health complaints, usually assessed by
self-report. There is little effort to call attention to simi-
lar claims being made about health conditions that pre-
sumably have very different etiologies and different
mechanisms by which negative emotion might conceiv-
ably influence disease status and outcome. Measures of
negative affectivity are hopelessly intercorrelated among
themselves, with a host of background and concurrent
confounders [27, 28], which Paul Meehl has termed the
“crud factor” [29]. This entire literature has been charac-
terized as a “big mush” [30]. Do we really need attempts
to replicate these studies to demonstrate that they lack
value? We could do with much less of this research,
particularly when it has almost always been conducted
with an unknown selection of both independent and
dependent variables examined in an unknown number
of analyses with an unknown basis for selecting and
publishing results. Under these conditions, one can even
demonstrate that astrological signs have comparable
associations with physical health outcomes [31].
Rather than anything resembling the RP:P model of
replication initiatives, clinical epidemiological research
would benefit most from publicly available cataloging of
variables found in different data sets; preregistration of
hypotheses and analytical strategies; fuller presentation
of simple associations as well as multivariate analyses;
sensitivity analyses incorporating alternative assumptions
and confounds; and data sharing, particularly with an
eye towards integration with other data sets so that a
comparison and contrast of results can be efficiently
obtained.
There will always be an inherently exploratory aspect
to this line of research. Indeed, many robust results
could not have been anticipated when such data were
originally collected. But that literature needs to be
approached with a greater recognition of the likelihood
of false positives, the influence of incompletely specified
and imperfectly measured confounds, and a greater re-
sistance to acceptance of p-values as revealing anything
of importance. Andrew Gelman [32] has provided a
valuable elaboration of the American Statistical Associ-
ation statement on p-values [33] with: “Valid p-values
cannot be drawn without knowing, not just what was
done with the existing data, but what the choices in data
coding, exclusion, and analysis would have been, had the
data been different.” A classic paper by De Groot [34]
offers a relaxed view of what can be presented, but a
much more restricted view of what can be taking ser-
iously, relative to current practices: “One ‘is allowed’ to
apply statistical tests in exploratory research, just as long
as one realizes that they do not have evidential impact”.
A poor model for exploring the untrustworthiness
of psychology? Unnecessary and unhelpful
elements built into the rules of replication
initiatives
Needless compromises were built into the design and
publication of the RP:P. These arbitrary procedural
rules for conducting replications could be more fruit-
fully turned into recommendations for how not to
conduct replications. The general theme of my objec-
tions is that collaboration initiatives, at least as they
are currently organized, bureaucratize and otherwise
make more complicated procedures that should be as
simple as the procedures that routinely put untrust-
worthy science into the literature. Current rules risk
‘ghettoizing’ replications when effort should be made
instead to insist on widening their acceptability, par-
ticularly in the prestigious journals that produced
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untrustworthy science. Furthermore, the RP:P and related
initiatives inadvertently strengthen questionable publica-
tion practices which we desperately need to challenge.
Kahneman’s adversarial collaboration
Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman [35] has been
influential in recommending:
“when the replication is ready – after a pilot but
before data collection – the replicator sends the
author a detailed description of the planned
procedure, including actual programs and a video
when relevant.”
And if there is any doubt in his position, he further
states:
“A good-faith effort to consult with the original
author should be viewed as essential to a valid
replication.”
Although well-meant and intended to preempt antici-
pated criticism of replication initiatives, Kahneman’s [32]
call for involving the authors of the original studies in
replication as an adversarial collaboration is unfortunate
for a number of reasons. Kahneman has provided a clear
rationale for this position:
“I share the common position that replications play
important role in our science – to some extent by
cleaning up the scientific record, mostly by deterring
soppy research. However, I believe the current norms
allow replicators too much freedom to define their
study is a direct replication of previous research.
Authors should be guaranteed a significant role in the
replications of their work.”
What could Kahneman possibly mean by “too much
freedom”? Ultimately neither the original authors nor
those who undertake replications have the final word on
whether a study can be deemed a direct replication of
previous research. That should be left to post publica-
tion peer review. Replication should be as freely under-
taken as original research, and so there is no reason to
slap this constraint on it. Would Kahneman extend this
principle to any effort to critically examine empirically
existing research findings or theoretical claims? Further-
more, if we insist on authors of original research being
involved in any replications, it takes pressure off them to
provide sufficiently clear and transparent description of
their methods in their publication of their original re-
sults. We should not coddle authors of scientific papers:
they should expect attempted replications as inevitable,
contingent upon how much effort replication would take
and the credibility being attached to their findings.
Pre-approval by peer review of attempted replications
The strong recommendation is that investigators planning
to attempt a replication should first get pre-approval by
independent peer review – including the authors of the
original research – of their rationale, design, and analytic
plans. Again, why adopt such cumbersome rules if publi-
cation of the original research was not subject to them?
Peer review can be a slow, undependable process that may
introduce biases, not only from the original investigator
but of theoretical and professional allies. John Ioannidis’
concept [36] of obligated replication comes to mind. This
refers to a corruption of peer review whereby proponents
of a dominant school of thought or theory control publi-
cation venues so they can largely select and mold what
gets published. This requirement of prior peer review of
replication initiatives inadvertently extends their control
to even what research can be re-evaluated.
Direct, rather than conceptual replication
Whether direct replication is preferred to conceptual rep-
lication or whether internal versus external validity is to
be emphasized depends a lot on context. It is common
practice going back to Berkowitz and Donnerstein [37] for
social psychologists to insist on the tightest of experimen-
tal procedures while at the same time claiming broadest
generalizability to the same world. Fraudster Diederik
Stapel [38] claimed that before he resorted to outright
fabrication of data, he wrote to investigators when he
could not replicate their striking findings. He often got
advice, such as:
“Don’t do this test on a computer. We tried that and
it doesn't work. It only works if you use pencil-and-
paper forms.”
“This experiment only works if you use ‘friendly’ or
‘nice’. It doesn't work with ‘cool’ or ‘pleasant’ or ‘fine’.
I don’t know why.”
Amazed that he could now replicate the results, Stapel
considered himself as admitted to the “Grand Fellowship
of Secret Procedures.”
Any investigator who has been in the field for very
long has realized that minor, seemingly arbitrary and
even theoretically irrelevant modifications in procedures
can lead to a considerable difference in the size and dir-
ection of results that are obtained. Insistence on direct
replication as a general principle rather than a strategy
requiring justification could perpetuate acceptance of
results of only limited generalizability. The issue becomes
more important when social or public health implications
are claimed for findings.
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For instance, a bug killing paradigm [39] has been used
to make socially important generalizations about soldiers
being put at risk for posttraumatic stress disorder when
they are placed in morally injurious situations. Arguably,
investigators attempting replications should not be con-
fined to the specific species of insects as the original ex-
periments, given the robustness and broad generalizations
claimed for the original study. If the replicators fail with
different insects, post-publication peer reviewers are free
to dismiss any utility of pursuing this line of research – or
to applaud it. Similar situations are posed by researchers
who claim in heavily promoted studies that positive think-
ing saps energy and initiative in everyday life, based on
studies of undergraduate females having their satisfaction
with the hypothetical purchase of high heels assessed in
interaction with a computer [40]. Given the common
undeclared conflicts of interest of these investigators
and such a broad claim of generalizability claimed for
everyday life, skepticism should be encouraged and not
constrained by these researchers’ subsequent claims of
lack of fidelity to the often fragile or poorly defined ori-
ginal experimental conditions.
Reversing the traditional perspective that a psychology
study should be tightly controlled in artificial laboratory sit-
uations, replicators might consider deliberately loosening
experimental control with the intention of incorporating
more real-world elements and testing the generalizability
of claims across variations. Experimental realism and simu-
lations of the context which generalizations are made
should trump original investigators’ opinions about the
fidelity of replications to the original manipulations.
Protecting premium top shelf journals from null findings
and attempted replication
The Open Science Collaboration’s attempted replication of
100 studies was published in the prestigious journal,
Science. Publishing the first paper from the replication ini-
tiative was consistent with the journal’s policy of valuing
the newsworthy and innovative. Yet, we should be skeptical
about whether publishing a bundled set of 100 attempted
replications of studies in prestigious psychology journals is
a game-changing precedent that will result in routine pub-
lication of smaller collections or a single replications in
premium top shelf journals. Science is a prime example of
a journal that has earned its “premium top shelf” status by
not routinely publishing replications or null findings unless
there is some extraordinary reason for doing so.
The prestigious psychology journals that published the
original studies slated for The Open Science Collaboration
effort – Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Psy-
chological Science, and Journal of Experimental Psych-
ology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition- are unlikely
anytime soon to give routinely attempted replications, par-
ticularly those producing null results, the same priority as
original research -which the RP:P suggested is untrust-
worthy. An outgoing editor of Psychological Science [41]
stated that he had rejected over 6000 submissions in his
five years as editor without the manuscript is going out to
reviewers. At the top of his three reasons was:
“The Pink Floyd Rejection: Most triaged papers were
of this type; they reported work that was well done
and useful, but not sufficiently groundbreaking. So
the findings represented just another brick in the wall
of science.”
Praise of “Pink Floyd rejection” can be turned into a
critique of a particular type of publication bias that char-
acterizes Journal of Personality and Social Psychology as
well as Psychological Science. It can serve as a warning
that replications of individual published studies, particu-
larly those that do not yield positive results, are not
welcomed. But such “bricks in the wall” are likely more
trustworthy than the over 50 % of Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology and Psychological Science articles
evaluated in the RP:P that did not reproduce with the
same strength of effects.
A number of compromises have been struck between
organized efforts to further replicate studies in the psycho-
logical literature and professional organization publishers.
Both the American Psychological Association and the
Association for Psychological Science have endorsed repli-
cation initiatives, but direct them to journals other than
their protected premium top shelf journals.
These compromises serve to protect the strong publi-
cation bias and therefore the unrepresentativeness of
what is published in these premium top shelf journals.
The prestige of JPSP and PS, as reflected in the journal
impact factors by which these two journals compete
against each other, is furthered by keeping out individual
replications, especially those with null findings. The val-
idity of journal impact factors has of course been subject
to withering criticism, but they still matter to early car-
eer investigators attempting to advance. Deals between
replication initiatives and the APS protect Psychological
Science from having to accept individual replications,
positive and failed, by requiring preregistration and gath-
ering replications up and herding them into a ‘ghetto’ in
Perspectives on Psychological Science. For the APA,
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology gets simi-
lar protection by exiling null psychotherapy trials in a
special section of brief reports in the less prestigious and
lower impact Journal of Psychotherapy Integration.
Successful and failed replications of studies originally
published in the APA’s Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology are referred on to the non-APA journal Social
Psychology. The energy of researchers seeking to im-
prove the trustworthy of psychologists are deflected
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from continued demands for enforcement of the Pottery
Barn rule (https://hardsci.wordpress.com/2012/09/27/a-
pottery-barn-rule-for-scientific-journals/): journals which
publish original research should be required to publish
attempted replications.
The right target: questionable publishing practices rather
than questionable research practices
Replication initiatives implicitly place the proximal cause
of untrustworthiness of psychological science in endemic
questionable research practices. Various list and taxon-
omies of QRP’s are available, but Simmons, Nelson, and
Simonsohn’s [42] list of six ways to p-hack are a useful
start, even if incomplete:
1. Stop collecting data once p < .05.
2. Analyze many measures, but report only those with
p < .05.
3. Collect and analyze many conditions, but only
report those with p < .05.
4. Use covariates to get p < .05.
5. Exclude participants to get p < .05.
6. Transform the data to get p < .05.
Although there is a general squeamishness about blam-
ing authors of individual papers, replication initiatives are
needed because of the high prevalence of these QRPs in
the psychological literature, even in the prestigious journals
which the RP:P sampled. Replication initiatives essentially
expose the QRPs in published research by demonstrating
that key findings cannot be reproduced when independent
investigators commit themselves to transparently plan,
conduct, and report their replication efforts.
But authors have incentives and protections for en-
gaging in QRPs from strong institutional pressures to pub-
lish noteworthy, immediately newsworthy, and ostensibly
novel findings versus findings that are more robust but
more mundane. As long as pressure on authors from in-
stitutions continues, replication initiatives waste the effort
of investigators in who might otherwise commit them-
selves to moving science ahead by building on the secure
foundation of more trustworthy past research.
Much could be accomplished by insisting on diligent
enforcement of existing rules and standards of best publi-
cation practices. Psychology has tended to take its cue
from reforms in the biomedical literature where compli-
ance, even though far from perfect, is more likely because
of the pressures of government and regulatory agencies
that insist on compliance as a condition for approval of
pharmaceuticals and medical devices. Psychological jour-
nals adopted Consolidated Standards of Reporting of
Trials (CONSORT) [43] later and less consistently than
medical journals did. Until my colleagues and I protested
[44], the American Psychological Association’s late
adoption of CONSORT applied only to randomized evalu-
ation of psychological interventions that were explicitly la-
beled randomized trials in the title or abstract. But that a
randomized trial is labeled as such is a checklist item of
the CONSORT checklist, not a condition under which the
checklist is applicable.
Requirements that the rationale, design, analytic plans,
and primary outcomes of clinical trials be registered are
similarly being only slowly and inconsistently adopted
for psychological interventions. There is evidence that
trial registration, if it takes place at all, is after data collec-
tion has begun [45]. There is further evidence that editors
and reviewers fail to consult published trial registration
and protocols in evaluating manuscripts, with the effect
that primary outcomes often shift in the published reports
[46]. Requests for sharing of data when sharing is man-
dated are often rejected or simply ignored, with evidence
that authors of studies with exaggerated interpretation of
findings or outright errors are less responsive to requests
for their data [47].
Lessons learned from challenging untrustworthy
psychology
I offer the following three instances of my colleagues
and I probing the untrustworthiness of the psychological
literature not as anecdata, but as prompts for anyone to
reproduce our efforts with other papers to see if evi-
dence of similar questionable publication practices can
be elicited. In each instance, we got locked into a time-
consuming process with unsatisfactory outcomes and
the initial claims continued to be cited. Yet, in each
instance, we also demonstrated that any effort at replica-
tion would have been wasteful. It would also have been
even more time-consuming. The simple lesson to be
learned is that we should not depend on replication ini-
tiatives when there is a more pressing need to imple-
ment and insist upon basic reform of publication
practices. But we also learned of the barriers to correc-
tion of questionable science, and the ineffectiveness of
letters to the editor as a means of post publication peer
review. In each instance, submitting a letter to the editor
marked the beginning of an unsatisfactory long-term
relationship with the authors being criticized.
Example 1
My colleagues and I were skeptical of effects claim for a
loving-kindness meditation intervention on physical health
[48] that was heavily publicized in the popular press and
cited as the science behind one of the senior author’s work-
shops. There was no mention in the article that the study
was a randomized trial. This was only revealed, as a pur-
ported strength of the study, in a popular book written by
the senior author. The report lacked basic features required
by a CONSORT checklist assessment of a manuscript
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being submitted for publication. Reanalysis of the data re-
vealed that apparent evidence of an effect in complex sec-
ondary analyses was due to an inexplicable deterioration in
the control group. We wrote a letter to the editor [49]
which was initially rejected with the associate editor stating
she would not allow us to engage in a “witch hunt.” Intend-
ing to appeal this decision, we discovered that contrary to
the requirements of Committee on Publication Ethics
(COPE), the journal did not specify a formal appeal
process. Our letter was eventually accepted, but the
authors got the last word in a letter [50] that did not ad-
dress the issues we raised. So, we uncovered (1) the journal
did not endorse CONSORT nor adhere to COPE guide-
lines; (2) a high threshold had been set for any correction
through the post-publication peer review of letters to the
editor; and (3) the authors did not have to meet the same
standards in replying. Finally, when the editor was alerted
to the financial conflict of interests of the authors, no
correction or erratum was issued. The first author of the
target article has left the original laboratory and al-
though continuing this line of research, no longer cites
the target article.
Example 2
I wrote a letter to the editor [51] concerning a paper in
a prominent journal that reported extraordinary effects
of psychological processes on physical health through
modification of gene expression [52]. The paper had
been highly publicized in the popular media and was
cited in workshops and webinars as the key evidence for
adopting particular life strategies. The authors responded
with a dismissive and evasive reply [53]. My colleagues
and I then obtained their data and demonstrated the same
results could be obtained by entering random numbers
into the equations. We also found some seemingly minor
errors in data coding and entry that turned out to have
profound effects in our reanalysis. The authors wrote an-
other dismissive response [54] and then altered what had
been the publicly available data set and re-analyzed their
data and published it elsewhere [55] with a harshly critical
attack on us. However, using date-stamped downloads of
their data, we were able to determine that the critiques of
us depended on integrating the altered dataset with
analyses based on the unaltered, original data set. Both
journals have refused to retract these papers.
Example 3
There has been international criticism of the PACE
clinical trial examining cognitive behavioral therapy
for chronic fatigue syndrome [56]. The authors
switched outcomes after the start of the trial. The
disputed interpretation of their results favored their
declared interests. A colleague and I wrote a letter to
the editor [57] and we had the usual unsatisfactory
reply from the authors [58].
Critics had made numerous requests to examine the
data, consistent with national and international recom-
mendations for data sharing. However, all requests have
thus far met with refusals under the UK Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA). I attempted to circumvent pre-
vious refusals to share data by making a formal request
for data from a related paper [59]. The difference was
the data from this paper were promised to be available
as a condition for publishing in PLOS One. The authors
responded by turning my journal-level request into a
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request – which it
was not – as well as attacking my character and motives
for requesting the data. I turned the matter back to
PLOS One, and after many months the issue is still not
resolved. This remains an ongoing saga. Months after
my initial request, I have not obtained the data.
Developing social media as an alternative to
overreliance on replication initiatives
It is impossible to quantify the prevalence of question-
able research practices and questionable publication
practices from results of replication initiatives. We can-
not estimate the needed, but unknown denominator of
what is left unpublished, distorted beyond recognition in
the prepublication peer review process, or left unwritten
because results cannot be suitably spun to fit a confirm-
ation bias. We cannot even estimate the incidence of
bruising encounters with the publication process like the
three I just described. In most cases, no trace appears in
the literature, particularly when initial letters to the editor
are rejected, often because of editorial practices allowing
authors veto power over publication of criticism.
I have generated attention on social media to my frus-
trated efforts to obtain data sets that should have been
available because of the conditions under which funding
was obtained for papers which were published. One basic
function of social media is whistleblowing, calling atten-
tion to such lapses in best practices, begin classifying and
quantifying them, and to mobilize efforts at reform.
However, as seen in important developments like
PubPeer and PubMed Commons, social media can pro-
vide effective and timely post publication peer review.
Attention on social media can either prompt authors
and journals’ self correction or provide a correction of
the subsequent record when, not infrequently, self cor-
rection is refused. In contrast to the drawn out unre-
warding processes into which my colleagues and I fell,
there are recent self-organizing threads of criticism on
PubPeer that have prompted notable postings of correc-
tions and even retraction within weeks or months. It
would be an interesting exercise for someone to examine
the 100 papers which the RP:P attempted to replicate
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and come to some consensus as to whether attempted
replication would be worth the effort. I strongly suspect
for many of these papers, it would not be. So, future repli-
cation initiatives – and they will inevitably occur – should
adopt such crowd sourced evaluation and preselection to
avoid wasting anonymous resources on work that is
simply not worth replicating.
Both PubPeer and PubMed Commons allow response
from authors whose work is criticized, but neither allows
these authors control ceded by the RP:P or conventional
letters to the editor. Both are unfettered in just the way
that is needed at this point of crisis in the trustworthi-
ness of psychology. PubPeer allows an anonymity that
outrages some authors and offends some critics. Yet, a
strong argument can be made that retaliation against
junior academics voicing criticism on Twitter warrant
anonymity, but regardless, this important feature shows
no signs of going away in the near future.
PubMed Commons requires commentators to register
and identify themselves and so is an important comple-
ment to PubPeer. PubMed Commons will eventually be
providing appropriate citation, access by search engines,
and credit in ways that can contribute to junior aca-
demics' career development. Overcoming the untrust-
worthiness of psychology will be a long, uncertain, and
often thankless task, meeting with predictable but also
unanticipated resistance. But reform can be accelerated
by the strategic use of social media and may, in fact,
depend on it.
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